This article examines the information warfare efforts of the Russians in Romania as a model for understanding how these operations can be configured to suit Moldova and Georgia. Relying on theoretical constructs from strategic communication, information warfare doctrine, and hybrid warfare theory, the analysis explores specific historical, cultural, and political vulnerabilities exposed by Russian disinformation actors in Romania. The analysis also notes the involvement of Brazil-linked social-media networks that amplified Russian narratives during key geopolitical moments, a feature that becomes relevant for understanding the broader architecture of cross-border disinformation flows. It then proposes predictive models for three possible directions of Russian political developments after 2022, and what differences in methodology, targeting, and effect are likely to arise. This review of evidence finds that Romania has been used as a research and development lab to perfect the methods of disinformation that are then retuned to neighboring contexts in accordance with local vulnerabilities. The article contributes to the academic discourse on information warfare by providing a comparative framework that can predict the development of Russian information campaigns across the post-Soviet space and Eastern Europe.
BT - Connections: The Quarterly Journal DA - 2025 DO - https://doi.org/10.11610/Connections.24.2.05 IS - 2 N2 -This article examines the information warfare efforts of the Russians in Romania as a model for understanding how these operations can be configured to suit Moldova and Georgia. Relying on theoretical constructs from strategic communication, information warfare doctrine, and hybrid warfare theory, the analysis explores specific historical, cultural, and political vulnerabilities exposed by Russian disinformation actors in Romania. The analysis also notes the involvement of Brazil-linked social-media networks that amplified Russian narratives during key geopolitical moments, a feature that becomes relevant for understanding the broader architecture of cross-border disinformation flows. It then proposes predictive models for three possible directions of Russian political developments after 2022, and what differences in methodology, targeting, and effect are likely to arise. This review of evidence finds that Romania has been used as a research and development lab to perfect the methods of disinformation that are then retuned to neighboring contexts in accordance with local vulnerabilities. The article contributes to the academic discourse on information warfare by providing a comparative framework that can predict the development of Russian information campaigns across the post-Soviet space and Eastern Europe.
PY - 2025 SE - 35 SP - 35 EP - 53 T2 - Connections: The Quarterly Journal TI - Information Warfare Laboratories: Comparing Russian Disinformation Operations in Romania and Potential Expansion to Moldova and Georgia VL - 24 SN - 1812-1098 ER -